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EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE HOSTAGE ACT:
NEW LIFE FOR AN OLD LAW

The Act of July 27, 1868, concerning the Rights of American
Citizens in Foreign States (Hostage Act), grants the President broad
authority to obtain the release of American citizens unjustly impris2
oned "by or under authority of any foreign government ....
More than a century after its adoption, the President invoked the
Hostage Act as authority for executive action taken in response to
the seizure of Americans at the United States Embassy in Tehran,
Iran. 3 Recent judicial opinions suggest the Hostage Act applies to
4
the events in Iran.
The Note first discusses the current Executive and judicial interest in the Hostage Act aroused by the American Embassy seizure
and similar incidents in other countries. Anticipating a courtroom
challenge to Presidential action under the Hostage Act, the Note
analyzes the exercise of the Executive's power. The Note first analyzes the statutory language to identify the conditions that must be
met before the President may properly invoke the Hostage Act.
Next, the Note identifies actions the President may take to obtain the
release of captive Americans. Finally, the Note discusses the degree
to which the judiciary may constitutionally review the Executive's
actions and the standards the courts must apply. The Note concludes that th6 President enjoys broad discretion under the Hostage
Act, and that the scope of judicial review is limited.
I
RECENT INTEREST IN THE ACT
A.

SEIZURE OF U.S. EMBASSY IN IRAN

On November 4, 1979, armed Moslem students invaded the
United States Embassy in Tehian, seized control of the compound,
and took sixty-six United States diplomatic and consular personnel
hostage.5 Over fourteen months passed before the last group of
I. Act of July 27, 1868, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), quoted in text accompanying note

21 infra.
2. d
3. See note 7 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 9 & 113 mfra and accompanying text.
5. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at AI, coL 6.
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Americans left Iran.6 President Carter's response to the Embassy
takeover included a delegation to the Secretary of State of his powers
under the Hostage ActY Specifically, the President authorized the
Secretary of State to restrict the use of United States passports for
travel "to, in or through Iran" and otherwise to regulate travel to
Iran by U.S. citizens and permanent residents.8
B.

JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE

ACT

No one has challenged the propriety of the President's use of the
Hostage Act to support the restrictions on travel to Iran by United
States nationals. However, a thoughtful dissent in Agee . Muskie,9
argues the validity of the action.
The Secretary of State revoked Agee's passport, claiming that
his activities abroad threatened the national security of the United
6 Id. Nov. 19. 1979. at Al. col. 6:id, Nov. 20. 1979. at Al. col. 4:d. July ]1. 1980.
col. 1.
at Al. col 6. id. Jan 21. 1981, at Al.
7 Exec Order No. 12.211. 45 Fed. Reg. 26.685 (1980). In addition to the travel
ban. see note 8 infra, the President imposed other political and economic sanctions
designed to isolate Iran and to secure the release of the American hostages. On November 14. 1979 President Carter ordered a freeze on Iranian government property in the
United States. Exec. Order No. 12.170.44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979); N.Y. Times. Nov. 15.
1979, at Al. col. 6. The President tightened visa controls for resident Iranian nationals
and virtually banned the issuance of new entry visas to Iranians. N.Y. Times. Apr. 8.
1980. at Al. col. 5. See also Narenji v. Civiletti. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979). cer.
denied, 100 S. Ct..2928 (1980). In April 1980. the United States formally severed all
diplomatic relations with Iran. N.Y. Times. Apr. 8. 1980. at Al. col. 6: id at A6. col. 2.
The President suspended all oil imports from Iran soon after the takeover and later
ordered a more comprehensive prohibition on all trade with Iran. Exec. Order No.
12.205. 45 Fed. Reg. 24.099 (1980); Exec. Order No. 12,211. 45 Fed. Reg. 26.685 (1980):
N Y Times. Nov. 13. 1979. at Al. col. 6: id. Apr. 8. 1980. at Al. col. 6: id at A6. col. 2.
The President issued the Executive orders to freeze Iranian assets and to restrict U.S.
trade with Iran pursuant to his authority under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 11 1978). and the National Emergencies Act.
50 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976).
8. Exec. Order No. 12,211. § 1-106. 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980). The Order also
relied for authority on § I of the Act of July 3. 1926.22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1976) (authorizing
the Secretary of State to grant, issue, and verify passports pursuant to Presidential direction) and on § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976)
(empowering the President to control travel of citizens and aliens during war or national
emergency).
The Secretary of State promulgated Department of State Public Notices implementing
Executive Order No. 12.211. Public Notice 711. effective April 23, 1980. invalidated
United States passports for travel to, in, or through Iran. The action was" required by
"'the increasingly unstable situation in Iran and the concomitant increase in the threat of
hostile acts against Americans." Pub. Notice No. 711. 45 Fed. Reg. 27.600 (1980). In the
companion Public Notice No. 712. also effective April 23. 1980. the Secretary of State
prohibited the travel by permanent resident aliens to. in or through Iran. . . unless an
exception to this prohibition is granted under the authority of the Secretary of State.Pub. Notice No. 712, 45 Fed. Reg. 27.600 (1980).
9. 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980). afrog Agee v. Vance. 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.
1980).
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States.' 0 Agee brought an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief in United States District Court. The District Court granted
Agee summary judgment, and ordered the restoration of his passport." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the Secretary of
State did not rely on the Hostage Act to support the revocation of
Agee's passport,' 2 the District Court and the panoramic dissent by
Judge MacKinnon on appeal both recognized that the Hostage Act
would have justified the government's action if rumors of Agee's ties
to the Iranian embassy captors were' true. 13 Judge MacKinnon
remarked:
When the facts of this case are taken by their four corners it is obvious that
the Secretary of State, acting as the Presidnct's lawful delegate, has determined that the revocation of Agee's passport is one of the means 'necessary
and proper to. . .effectuate the release' of the American hostages held captive in Iran. The Hostage Statute fits the present situation in Iran like a glove
4
and. . . supports the Secretary's denial (or revocation) of a passport.'

In dictum the trial court, although not as enthusiastic as Judge
MacKinnon, made the same observation.' 5 Judge MacKinnon's
expansive construction of the statute is noteworthy. Now that Iran
has released the American hostages, Judge MacKinnon's opinion
will be of little help to government attorneys pursuing Agee's passport revocation before the Supreme Court.' 6 However, his argument
10. Philip Agee. a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency residing in West
Germany. delibe.rately exposed the identities of covert CIA operatives. The government
revoked his passport, relying on a provision of the passport regulations that authorized
the Secretary of State to refuse a passport when -It]he Secretary determines that the
national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the
national security or the foreign policy of the United States.- 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4)
(1980).
11. The court found the challenged regulation invalid as unauthorized by Congres.
483 F. Supp. at 732. When the Secretary issued the regulation in !968 he relied upon § I
of the Act of July 3, 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1976). The Passport Act did not expressly
authorize the denial or revocation of passports-on national security grounds. The Act of
July 3, 1926, § 1, 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1976). The Secretary could not point to any subsequent legislation that expressly delegated such authority. The Secretary also failed to
prove that Congress had impliedly authorized his action.
12. Brief for Appellant at iv, Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
13. An article in the New York Post reportcd that Agee had been invited by the
Iranian government to participate in a "Tribunal" to judge the American hostages. The
government did not argue this fact as a justification for the revocation TfAgee's passport.
but Judge MacKinnon thought it significant. 629 F.2d at 90 (MacKinnon. J..
dissenting).
14. Id at 96 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
15. "If[Agee's] activities are detrimental to the hostages in Iran. a special statute
exists, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), which app.ars to give the President extraordinary authority to act." Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 73216. The Supreme Court reversed Haig v. Agee, 49 U.S.LW. 4869 (1981). It upheld
the State Department revocation of Agee's passport, but failed to rely on the Hostage Act
inits decision. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court contains several references to
the allegations that Agee had friendly contact with the Iranian captors:
Government affidavits show that Agee made contact with the captors, urged
them to demand certain CIA documents, and offered to travel to Iran to analyze
the documents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 11 7a: N.Y. Times. Dec. 24. 1979. p. 6. col.
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may provide the government with a basis for the prosecution 7 of

other Americans who visited Iran in violation of the travel ban-)

5.A Government affidavit also mentions, but does not vouch for the accuracy
of. an earlier report that Agee had been invited to travel to Iran in order to
participate in a -Revolutionary Tribunal- to pass judgment on those hostages.
App. to Pet. for Cert. I I6a-1 17a.
Id.at 4871 n.8.
Despite these direct allusions to Agee's possible involvement with the captors in Iran.
the Supreme Court upheld the revocation by reading into the Passport Act an authorization for the Secretary of State to revoke passports in the interests of national security. Id.
The opinion relies on the potential damage to the nation's security that Agee's anti-CIA
activities caused. It expressly declines to rely on the events in Iran or the Executive
orders restricting travel:
On November 14, 1979, in response to the seiTure of the American Embassy in
Iran (supra. n.8). President Carter declared a national er.ergency. Exec. Order
No. 12170. 44 Fed. Reg. 65729. The President's Order contains an express
finding, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 ed.. Supp. II). "that the situation in Iran constitutes
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security. foreign policy and
economy of the United States." The Government has never relid upon that
Order to justify the passport revocation in the present case. General restrictions
on travel to Iran under American pasports apparently did not go into effect until
several months after Agee's passport was revoked. See Exec. Ord:r No. 12211.
45 Fed. Reg. 26685 (April 17. 1980). Accordingly, our decision in this case does
not depend on the declaration of national emergency.
Id.at 4871 n.14.
The Court may hxse been reluctant to ground its decision on the allegations of Agee's
involvement with the Iranian captors because those reports were unsubstantiated. In any
event, the government failed to argue that the Hostage Act had any application to the
case. The government's interest in retaining maximum Executive discretion is served
better by the Supreme Court's opinion. which finds general authority for passport revocation on national security grounds, than by a more narrow holding based on the Hostage Act. which only applies in rare circumstances.
17. The Justice Department instructed the Treasury Department to determine
whether the trip by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and nine other Americans to
Iran in defiance of the travel ban violated the law. N.Y. Times. June 8. 1980. at AI, col.
5. If corivicted of violating the travel regulations. the group would have been subject to a
fine not exceeding S2,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years. or both. 18
U.S.C. § 1544 (1976). The Department of Justice later announced that it would not file
criminal charges against Mr. Clark, but reserved the right to proceed in a civil action for
the violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 17011706 (Supp. 11 1978)). N.Y. Times. Jan. 8, 1981, at A6, col i. The maximum civil penalty for violation of the Act is $10.000. 50 U.S.C. § 17 05(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
Mrs. Barbara Timm, mother of hostage Kevin Hermening. visited Tehran in April
1980. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1980, at Al. col. 4. The Carter administration decided she
did not violate the travel ban because she left the United States after the President
announced the ban but before the promulgation of the implementing regulations.
Congressman George Hansen (R-Idaho) visited the American hostages on a selfappointed "mercy mission" to Iran in November 1979. Id, Nov- 26, 1979, at Al. coL 5.
Rep. Hansen's visit, though controversial. preceded promulgation of the travel ban regulations. By making the unofficial trip, however, the Congressman may have violated the
Logan Act, which forbids certain private contact with foreign governments and their
leaders. See note 122 htfra.
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C.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S RELIANCE ON THE
HOSTAGE ACT

The reintroduction of the Hostage Act as a source of Executive
power has broad implications. In a world marked by volatile relations among nations and a meteoric increase in incidents of international terrorism,- the prospect of more hostage incidents is
frighteningly real.' Recent attacks on other United States Embassies and diplomatic personnel demonstrate that the Iranian seizure
was part of a larger problem.19
The Act's loose textual limits on executive action appe-ar to vest
the President with "extraordinary authority." 20 President Carter's
use of the Hostage Act presents the first opportunity to examine the
scope of executive authority under the statute. Future chief executives and courts necessarily will seek guidance from an analysis of
the Hostage Act in the context of the Iranian hostage crisis.
II
TESTING EXECUTIVE USE OF THE HOSTAGE
ACT
This Note anti-cipates a challenge to executive action taken
under authority of the Hostage Act. The century-old statute provides:
Whenevcer it is made known to the President that any citizen of the
United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the
authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President
forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment;
and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American
citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen.
18. See generally LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (A. Evans & J.
Murphy ed. 1978); INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975).
19. On November 21, 1979, an angry crowd stormed the United States Embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan, killing one Marine guard, and holding 100 people hostage for five
hours. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1979, at AI, col. 3. On December 2, 1979. Khomeini sympathizers attacked and set fire to the United States Embassy in Tripoli. Libya. American
Embassy personnel escaped safely. Id, Dec. 3. 1979. at Al, coL 3. On the same day an
anonymous caller threatened to bomb the United States Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.
Id at AI4,col. 4.
During the same period leftist guerrillas shot their way into the Organization of American States offices in San Salvador, El Salvador, wounding five persons ana taking six
others hostage. Id, Sept. 18, 1979, at Al0. col. 1.Also in El Salvador, militants seized
the Panamanian Embassy, taking five persons hostage including the Panamanian and
Costa Rican Ambassadors to El Salvador. Id, Jan. 12. 1980, at AS, col. 1.Other incidents are listed in E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAw 139 (1976). Seegeneraly C. BAUMANN.
THE DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS (1973); L BLOOMFIELD & G. FrrzGE.wD, CRIMES
AGAINST

INTERNATIONALLY

PROTECTED

(1975).
20. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 732.
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and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war. as he may think
necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and
proceedings relative thereto2 1shall as soon as practicable be communicated by
the President to Congress.

The plaintiff will likely be an American national and will contest the
President's action on several grounds.2 The plaintiff may allege that
the President's reliance upon the Hostage Act was misplaced because
the statute, by its terms, did not apply to the particular factual situationl.23 Even in cases where the statute applies, the plaintiff may
challenge the President's action as overbroad, alleging that he
exceeded the scope of his delegated powers.2 4 If the plaintiff
concedes or loses the first two arguments, he may argue that the
President's action, though conteiplated by Congress, was
unconstitutional. 2 5 The Note examines these objections in turn.
A.

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND JUSTICIABILITY

Before a court can reach the merits of a challenge to executive
action under the Hostage Act, the court must dispose of two substantial. constitutionally compelled barriers to judicial review: the stand6
ing requirement and the political question doctrine.
As a threshold matter, to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements
of Article 11, an individual plaintiff must have standing to bring suit
in a federal court." The individual plaintiff must show that the President's actions caused him to suffer an"injury in fact, and that the
relief sought will redress his claimed injury.27 Congressmen 2 8 and
watchful citizens 29 also must satisfy rigorous standing requirements.
Even in a case where all of the normal prerequisites for ju-isdiction exist, the court may invoke the political question doctrine and
refuse to render a decision on the substantive issue presented.30
21. Act of July 27, 1868. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) [hereinafter ited as Hostage Act).
22. The analysis of this Note does not extend to challenges maintained in foreign
courts or before international tribunals; proceedings brought to protect the interests of a
foreign government are not considered.
23. See notes 46-72 infra and aocompanying texL
24 See notes 73-97 i..!ra and accompanying text.
25 See notes 98-125 mfra and accompanying text.
26. This abbreviated disusion draws heavily from L HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND TIME CONSTITUTION 205-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HENKiNI and Firmage. The
0W'ar Powers and Mhe PoliicalQuestion Doctrine. 49 U. COLO. L REv. 65 (1977).
27. Duke Power-Go. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59. 7879 (1978); see C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (1976).
28. Goldwater v. Carter. 100 S. CL 533 (1979) (mem.). The lower court outlined the
requirements for congressional standing in the federal courts. Goldwater v. Carter. 481
F. Supp. 949. 951 (D.D.C. 1979).
29. See Schlesinger v. Rescrvists Committee to Stop the War. 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
30. See C. WRIGHT. LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 14 (1976).
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Courts will not decide issues that they consider appropriate for reso3
lution within the political branches. '
The separation of powers principle forms the basis for the political question doctrine. The nature of majoritarian democracy
demands that some answers come from the branches of government
most subject to popular opinion. Other, more pragmatic reasons for
judicial abstention exist. A court will defer to the Congress and
Executive on politically sensitive questions, 32 or when the consequences of misjudgment would be severe. The court may also recognize that crisis resolution demands an unchallenged national
response, or fast action, both of which are incompatible with relatively, formal judicial decisionmaking. In other instances, a court
may feel less able than the political branches to draw upon the information, expertise, or experience necessary to resolve the controversy.3 3 The leading case on political question doctrine identifies the
important factors relevant to the decision.34
31. In fact, the same case gave birth to both judicial review and political question
nonjusticiability. In Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice
Marshall, in a significant dictum, announced that the Court would not exercise its newfound review power willy-nilly:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executi',e, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
id at 170.
32. However, the courts have not hestitated to review some extremely "political"
cases: United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1%2)
(reapportionment decision); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (steel seizure case).
33. Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the political question
doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of
(a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution:
(b) the sheer momentousness of it,
which tends to unbalance judicial judgment:
(c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that
perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally (-in a mature democracy-), the
inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
A. BICKEL, THE LEsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1%2).
34. It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Despite the various constitutional grants of federal court jurisdiction over matters that concern foreign affairs, the court's most
emphatic exercise of political question nonjusticiability has occurred

in cases dealing with foreign relations.3

Courts are quick to dismiss

a suit when an interbranch disagreement will embarass our government overseas, or imperil sensitive foreign relations. 7 But courts

will not refuse judicial review merely because a case concerns foreign affairs. Supreme Court dictum suggests that the Justices will
undertake an examination of the specific issues involved to deter-

38
mine if judicial review is proper.
Many of the issues presented in Hostage Act litigation before
the federal courts will be nonjusticiable political questions. Plaintiffs

will challenge the President's sensitive, political decisions that have a
significant foreign impact. A decision by the President that detention of Americans is "by pr under authority of a foreign govern35.

U.S. Co sT. art. III § 2 provides: 'The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made
...
to allCases affecting Ambasadors. other public Mintf&ers and Consuls . . . and
betwoen a State. or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
(Emphasis added.)
36. Such decisions are -wholly confided by our Constitution to the political
departments of the government. Executive and Legislative. They are delicate.
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They ar And should be
undertaken only by thosedirectly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities*nor responsibility and which has long been held to
belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.. 333 U.S. 103. I1 (1948).
"The conduct of the foreign relations of our Govirnment is committed by the Consti.
tution to the Executive and Legislave--the political'-cpartments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co. 246 U.S. 297. 302
(1918). See Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet) 415 (1839); Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat-) 610 (1818).
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
38. Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably
to show a discriminating analysis of the particular questi'n posed, in terms of the
history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the
possible consequences ofjudicial action.
Id at 211-12.
...

Despite common impressions and numerous citations, there arc in fact few cases,
and apparently no foreign affairs case, id which the Supreme Court ordained or
approved such judicial abstention from constitutional review or from deciding
some other question that might have led to a different result in the case. In the

foreign affairs cases commonly cited the courts did not refrain from judging
political actions by constitutional standards; they judged them but found them
constitutionally not wanting.
HENXIN, Apm note 26, at 213-14 (footnote omitted).
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ment," 39 presents a political question. *° So does a decision regarding
deployment of troops or the validity of an undeclared war." In the
cases arising under the Hostage Act the need for a single national
reaction to crisis will be clear The potential for international
embarrassment from internal disagreement will be high. The time
required to organize the issues and assemble sometimes sensitive
facts for judicial review may take too long when the lives of hostages
are at stake.
A court will be more willing to reach the merits of the case when
the challenged Presidential action causes domestic, rather than foreign injury. In those cases the fact that an international event triggered the Hostage Act will not necessarily insulate the President
39. Hostage Act, note 21 supra.
40. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. Foreign government recognition and
determination regarding sovereignty of a foreign territory lie in the discretion of the
political branchts (usually the Executive) and the courts will not intervene, even if international law dictates a contrary decision.
In Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839), the insurance company
challenged the President's decision that Argentina did not exercise sovereignty over the
Falkland Islands. The Court invoked the political question doctrine:
And can there be any doubt, that when the executive branch of the government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shill in its correspondence
with a foreign nation assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or
country, it is conclusive on the judicial department? And in this view it is not
material to inquire, nor is it the province of the Court to determine, whether the
executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know, that in the exercise of his
constitutional functions, he had decided the question. Having done this under
the responsibilities which belong to him, it is obligatory on the people and government of the Union.'
Id at 420. See also Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign. dejure or defacio, of a territory
is not s,judicial, btit a political question, the determination of which by the legislative
and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges ....
-). -,
Nothing in the Baker . Carr analysis,see note 34 upra, indicates that the Court will
abandon this line of precedent concerning recognition and sovereignty decisions.
41. Much litigation in this area arose out of the Vietnam conflict In Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court held that the district court properly dismissed the suit, and refused to guage the constitutionality of the Vietnam War in the
absence of a showing of clear Presidential abuse, amounting to bad faith. See, eg.,
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert dazei&4 416 U.S. 936 (1974):
Atlee v. Laird, -47 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'dsub no"L Atlee
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
One commentator approves the result in the early Vietnam War cases only because
they arose at a time when the Congress supported, or ratified, the Executive's prosecution
of the war. However, when the two branches openly disagree over the Executive's use of
the war powers, the Baker v. Carr analysis, see note 34 mpra, would clearly indicate the
propriety of independent judicial review. Congress' passage, over Presidential veto, of
the War Powers Resolution, note 91 infra, is a firm statement of the legislature's position
on Presidential exercise of the war power, and frees the judiciary from the restraint of
the political question doctrine to review the constitutionality of the executive's future
exercise of the war powers. See Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Qtuetion
Doctrine, 49 U. COLo. L. REv. 65, 89-99 (1977). See also notes 86-97 ifra and
accompanying text.-
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from judicial review. This is particularly true when the domestic
exercise of executive power infringes on individual rights.12
Having appropriately disposed of the threshold issues, the court
will proceed to the merits of the questions presented. In addition to
the difficult substantive issues, the courts and the litigants will
encounter troublesome evidentiary problems. 43 While difficulties of
proof need not necessarily oust a court of jurisdiction, they argue for
a more limited scope of review.," When the problems of proof
derive from the separate role of the Executive, they bring the case
45
closer to the border of nonjusticiability.
42

"The Supreme Court has never invoked the political question doctrine to dismiss

an indi idual's claim that a foreign relations action deprived him of constitutional

rights " Hit .KiN. supra note 26. at 485 n.6. The lower courts have come close to doing
so, hovevcr Holmes v. Laird. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.). cert denied 409 U.S. 869
(19721. ,,as an action American sevicemen brought to prevent the United States from
returning them to West Germany to serve prison sentences a Girman court rendered.
The s4dicrm alleged that the German trial denied them rights guaranteed under the
United States Constitution. including the right to confront witnesses against them. the
right to effective counsel, and the right to a full and accurate transcript on appeal.
Because the surrender complied with the applicable NATO multilateral agreement, howe er. the court refused to reach the merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claims. It held
that the matter presented a nonjusticiable political question. In an oblique reference to
the Hostage Act. the court suggested that courts will not decide at least some of the issues
under the statute: "Nor do we pass ,pon aippeUants' contention that their sentences
unjustly deprive them of their liberty, but simply note that such a claim has long been
addressable to the President." Id at 1225 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964)).
43. Many of the problems of proof arise because most of the determinative facts
occur abroad. Subpoenas will not reach essential witnesses-either captives or captors.
The U S. court might be forced to apply and interpret foreign law to resolve what otherskisc Aould be a purely domestic suit- The foreiin law might be in a state of. turmoiL
particularly if governments changed or clashed for recognition.
A related problem arises when the President refuses to make available information
which forms an important part of the challenger's case. The court would be in the difficult position of having to order the President to disclose sensitive and confidential information. There is authority to suggest that the President may refuse to obey such an
order. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). where the Court stated
"faibsen a claim of need to protet military diplomatic, or sensitiv national ecauiz "
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of presidential communications is significantly diminished by.production
of such matcria; for in camera inspection." Id at 706 (emphasis added). The circumstances surrounding the President's use of the Hostage Act may justify his exercise of a
pnvilege to refuse disclosure of information to a litigant. To illustrate, if a plaintiff had
requested disclosure of information regarding the captivity of the American hostages in
Iran in early 1980. President Carter would probably have vigorously refused the request
in order to safeguard the security and secrecy of the rescue mission undertaken on April
25. 1980. N.Y. Times. Apr. 25. 1980, at Al. col 6. See also N.Y. Times, May 17. 198i.
§ 6 (Magazine). at 103.
44. The court's competence to decide the issues is called into question when neither
the parties nor the court is able to produce evidenclon critical issues. -Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found . .. a lack ofjudicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it .... " Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S.
at 217.
45. The Nixon Court quoted with approval Chicago & S. Air Lines. Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.. 333 U.S. 103 (1948):
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I.

STATUTORY CHALLENGES

Defining Unjust Deprivation of Liberty

The Hostage Act imposes conditions on the President's authority to take extraordinary action.46 The statute is implicated when it
is "made known '"4 7

_to

the President that an American has been

"unjustly deprived of his liberty."4' The absence of specific standards defining an unjust deprivation of liberty may lead to dispute.
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for for-

eign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not axd ought
not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the
relevant information, should review and perh~ps nullify actions of the Executive
taken on information properly held secret.
418 U.S. at 710 (quoting 333 U.S. at 11). See generally THE CoNsmmo-oN AND THE
CoNDUcT OF FOREIGN POLICY 6-57 (F. Wilcox & R. Frank ed. 1976).

46. In addition to the procedural prerequisites discussed at length in the text. the
Hostage Act requires the President to demand of the foreign government the release of
the citizen before taking any extraordinary action.
The President normally communicates with foreign governments through diplomatic
channels. However, in the situation contemplated by the statute, conventions of diplomacy would support severance of diplomatic relations as a sign of national displeasure.
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw §409 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). The enacting

Congress, while not withdrawing this measure from the -means" available to the President to effectuate the release of citizens, strongly disapproved of hasty severance of diplomatic representation. The Senate defr.iated an amendment to the Hostage Act which
would have required the President to promptly break diplomatic correspondence with
the offending government. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.. 2d. Sess. 4359 (1868). The drafters thought it advisable to have diplomatic representatives-available to negotiate the
release of captive Americans abroad.
President Carter severed diplomatic relations with the government of Iran in April
1980. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1980, at AI, coL 6. Early severance was reasonable in view of
the diplomatic status of the hostages and the total interference with the diplomatic mission to lran. In the absence of formal relations between the United States and Tehran.
the Swiss government agre~d to represent American interests in Iran. Id, Apr. 25. 1980.
at A12, col. 2.
As a further condition of the President's authority to act, the statute's grant of executive power only becomes effective when the imprisoning state unreasonably delays or
refuses to release the detained citizens. Hostage Act, note 21 .supra. The question may
arise whether the words or acts of the foreign state do in fact constitute a refusal. The
aggrieved plaintiff in Hostage Act litigation may assert that the foreign state had reason
to delay and that the President should have waited before acting. For various reasons,
the President's determination, of what constitutes refusal or that a reasonable amount of
time has elapsed deserves great judicial -respeclt. See note 84 infra and accompanying
text. Fairness does suggest, however, that the President issue a statement indicating that
he has complied with the procedural requirements ofdemand and delay or refusal before
relying on the, Hostage Act for extraordinary authority. This will forestall a contention
that the President failed to observe these conditions precedent.
The Hostage Act also insists on the President's prompt communication to Congress of
all relevant "facts and proceedings." See Hostage Act, note 21 .upra.
47. The statute fails to specify the quality or quantum of information on which the
Executive may properly rely; no standard distinguishes between rumor and confirmed
observation. The courts generally accord great respect to the President's assessment of
overseas situations: "He has his confidential sources ofinformation. He has his agents in
the form of diplomatic, consular and other offcials." United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
48. Hostage Act, note 21 supra.
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The language of the Hostage Act thus appears to make the President the judge of the propriety of foreign detentions.49 This delegation comports with the substantial authority which suggests that-the
judiciary is ill-advised to make such a determination-5 Even if a
court agrees to reach the merits, the judicially developed act of state
doctrine compels the court to give great respect to a determination
by the foreign state that it considers the detention just and proper
under its law. 5 ' When a hostage taking represents more than just the
49. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.. 2d Sess. 4330 (1868) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
50. For a discussion of the justiciability of this and related issues. see ,totes 30-45
supra and accompanying texL
51. The classic formulation of the act of state doctrine appears in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). In that case the plaintiff sought to recover damages for his
detention in Venezuela and for alleged assaults by the Venezuelan soldiers. The Court
refused to inquire into the validity of these alleged acts:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id at 252.
As applied, the doctrine does pot remove a case from the court's jurisdiction. but only
forecloses judicial inquiry into the merits of the alleged act of state. Ricaud v. American
Metal Co.. 246 U.S. 304 (1918). The ac.s of a foreign state are presumptively valid, even
when the act complained of is contrary to forum state law or state public policy. United
States v. Pink. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Commentators and courts have debated extensively
the constitutional and theoretical rationale for the doctrine. Authorities have discussed
the doctrine in relation to principles of public international law (Comment. The Ac of
State Doctrine--ItsRelation to Prh'vareand heblic lnternationa Law. 62 COLUM. L REv.
1278 (1962)). the separation of powers doctrine (Hcnkin. The ForeignAffair Power of the
FederalCot w Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L REv. 805 (1964)). notions of comity (Note.Acts
of State andthe Conflict of Lar, 35 N.Y.U.L REv. 234 (1960)). and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity (Note, The Castro Goyernmet in An eican Courm: Sovereign Immm.
rnit andthe dct ofState Doctrine, 75 HARV. L REv. 1607 (1962)). In operation it resembles a conflict of law rule, but because the doctrine gives effect to the foreign nation's law
even if it violates United States. public policy, it goes much further than the traditional
conflicts rule. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELTiONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 41. Comment c (1965) Williams, The Ac of State Doctrine: A/red
Duhill of London, Inc. v. Republi" of Cuba. 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 735 (1976).
In the course of the development of the act of state doctrine, the so-called Bernstein

exception emerged. In a series of cases involving actions of the Nazi government ordering the conversion of stock of a certain company, the courts developed an exception to
the traditional rule of judicial abstention. Bernstein v. Van Hcyghen Freres Societe

Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cem%denied 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maattschappij. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
Following Bernstein the courts are free to examine the merits of an act of state when the

executive branch either expressly or impliedly invites judicial scrutiny. Commentators
have severely criticized this absolute deference to Executive suggestion (Miller. Transitional TraptrmnaiojlLo 65 COLUM. L REv. 836 (1965)).
The modern expression of the act of state doctrine is found in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964):
Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not
examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of the
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protests of a fringe group of militants--when it becomes an action
suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates
customary international law.
Id at 428.
This case has generated volumes of commentary and criticism in the literature (See,
e.g., R. FALK, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO 35 (1965); Henkin, The Foreign Afair
Powers ofthe FederalCourts. Sabbantio, 64 COLUM. L REv. 805 (1964). Metzger. Ade-ofState DoctrineRe&te "" The Sabbatkmo Care, 1964 SUP.CT. REV.223 (1964); Reeves, The
Act of State Doctrine-ForeignDecisions, Cited In the Sabbano Case. A Rebuttaland
Memorandum of Law, 33 FORDHAM L.REV. 599 (1965)). Congress, outraged that the
Sabbaino Court spared Fidel Castro's government judicial examination a the expense
of American victims of expropriation, quickly passed an amendment to reverse, in part,
the decision. Act of Oct. 7, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(dX4), 78 StaL 1013 (codified
in 22 U.S.C. § 2370(eX2) (1976)). The "Sabbetino" amendment reverses the presumption in favor of foreign act validity by instructing the courts to adjudicate the lawfulness
of a foreign act which is in violation of international law, unless the President indicates
otherwise. This amendment only applies to situations involving a foreign seizure of
property which violates international law. Commentators and academicians have criticized the amendment because it politicizes the court by granting to the Executive a power
to tell the courts what matters they may adjudicate. See Domke & Henkin. Act of State.
Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress. 3 COLUM. -4. TRtANSNATL L. 99 (1965);
Mazaroff, An Evaluationofthe Sabbano Amendment as a Legislative Guardianof American Private Investment Abroad 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 788 (1969).
Since the Sabbatino decision the case law emanating from the lower courts defining
the contours and the content of the doctrine has been both confused and confusing. The
Supreme Court has issued two opinions en the subject, neither of which garnered the
support of a majority of the Justices. Writing for the three justice plurality in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Justice Rehnquist
did not apply the act of state doctrine, but permitted the American bank to litigate a
counterclaim on the merits. Justice Rehnquist seemed to revive the Bernstein exception.
although the vitality of the exception is certainly'in question because of the issuance of
four other opinions soundly, criticizing his view.
Justice White wrote the plurality opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba. 425 U.S, 682 (1976). An analysis of the opinion suggests that the Court has
created a commercial law exception to the doctrine, but this interpretation of the doctrine, which commanded the support of only three Justices, is not authoritative. Note.
The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine: A Change In The Perception ofthe ForeignAct of
State, 38 U. PiTT. L. REV. 725 (1977); Note,4AIred Dunhil of London, Inc. Y.Republic of
Cuba: The Act ofState Doctrine--Alteringthe Soyereign' New Cloak. 7 CAL W. InT'L
L.i. 662 (1977).
Rigid application of the act' of state doctrine in Hostage Act litigation would cause
serious problems. Observance of the Sabbatino formulation will create, not prevent, an
interbranch controversy. In domestic Hostage Act cases challenging executive authority,
the President must assert the invalidity of the foreign detention in order to make the Act
applicable. Blind acceptance of the validity of the foreign detention by the reviewing
court on act of state grounds would put the court in direct, conflict with the PresidentSuch a course of action would put the court in the paradoxical posture of having to
disagree with the Executive in order to avoid interbranch controversy. The doctrine does
not leave the court free to abstain on the issue of foreign act validity; it requires the court
to accept as given the validity of the detention. This may insure harmonious separation
of powers when the political branches deal with the foreign act extrajudicially, but in
Hostage Act litigation, where the Executive is forced to argue in court against the propriety of the foreign detention, the act of state doctrine is counterproductive.
The better approach would be to merge the act of state doctrine into a political question analysis. Goldbert & Bradford, he Act of State Doctrine"Dunilland Other Sabbatino Progeny, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1977). Rather than having two categories of judicial
abstention, the courts should analyze the question of the validity of foreign detention as a
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adopted by a foreign government as its own-a court may treat the
event as an act of state, and refuse to inquire into the validity of the
incident.
The Hostage Act instructs the President to determine the propri-

ety of the foreign detention, but does not tell the Executive whether
to consult the law of the imprisoning state, American law, or international law.52 Although the President is not required to accept foreign
standards of justice, prudence counsels that he abide by foreign decisions in most cases.5 3 If a court of law in the foreign state has held
the detention valid, the Executive's refusal to respect that determination could contribute to the deterioration of relations between the
nations and increase the chance of hostilities. Moreover, a Presidential decision to ignore the foreign court's judgment would greatly
political question best suited to resolution by the Executive. When the Executive has
expressed an opinion on the Issue. as in the case where the government is forced to
defend its exercise of Hostage Act powers in a civil suit, the court should accept the
Presidcnit's characterization. Failure to do so violates the spirit of the constitutional theory enunciated in Sabbatno The courts are unlikely to confront a case of the son discussed in this Note where the Executive has not adopted the position that the foreign
detention is invalid. See notes 30-45 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
political question non-justiciability.
See generall)"Note. The Stams OfThe-Ict OfState Doctrine-ApplicationTo Lifigation
.4rising From Confiscations Of .4merican Owed Propeqy in Iran. 4 SUFFOLK TRANS'NTL' L.J. 89 (1980) (an exhaustive collection of cases and survey of the literature): Note.
Rehabiltation and Exoneration ofthe 4ct of State Doctrine. 12 N.Y.UJ. INr*L L. & POL.
599 (1980). Ncte. An 4nalysis of theAcof State Doctrine, 22 N.Y.L. Scii. L. REv. 995
(1977).
52. The legislative-history of the Hostage Act makes clear the effort of Congress to
articulate, if not to resolve, this important issue. Motivation for the Hostage Act came
from imprisonment in Britain of American citizens associated with the Fenian Movement in support of Irish rights. British law did not recognize the right of an individual to
renounce the cbligations of British citizenship by acquiring citizenship elsewhere. Britain detained naturalized American Fenians of British binhfor failure to satisfy obligations due the Crown. To encourage and support immigration, the American Congress
endorsed the right to liberal expatriation in the same bill as the Hostage Act. See 15 Stat.
224 (1868). This set up the clash of laws issue for the Fortieth Congress: Britain, assertIng the propriety of the Fenian detentions under its doctrine of no expatriation; the U.S..
equally certain that assumption of her citizenship relieved the immigrant of any duties to
his native country. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON TE RIGHTS OF
AMERICAN CITIZENS uiq FOREIGN STATES, 40th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1868). reprinted in
CONG. GLOBE- 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app.. at 100 (1868). The report acknowledged the
difficult position of the United States: -It is not our province to examine laws of England
under which these prosecutions have been conducted. . . . There are no rules of universal authority by which Governments are guided in regulating the rights of subjects.- ld
at 95.
53. In the case of the recent hostage crisis, an Iranian official. Mr. Bani-Sadr. asserted
the legitimacy of the Embassy takeover after he found out -it was not a real embassybut a spy operation. N.Y. Times. Nov. 12. 1979. at Al. col. 6. See also note 71 infra
One writer disagrees sharply with this position: "The seizure and continued detention
of the detainees are in violation of Islamic law, Islamic international law, and conventional international law. Their detention also constitutes a crime under Islamic criminal
law because there is no legal justification for it...
- Bassiouni. Protection oqfDbpomats
Under Islamic Law. 74 AM. J. INT'L L 609. 631 (1980).
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diminish the value of foreign judgments.
Undoubtedly Congress did not intend the President to use our
domestic law to gauge the foreign state's treatment of our citizens.
But neither did the Congress intend to force him to accept the determination of the imprisoning forum, no matter how savage and
unfair."5 There is some indication in the legislative history that the
President should turn to international law for guidance-5-"
54. Judgments of foreign courts do not qualify as "acts of state." See Note. The
Status of the 4c of State Doctrine--Applicationto ltigation Arising From Confiscationsof
American Owned Properly in Iran, 4 SUFFOLx TRANSNAT'L LJ. 89. 100 (1980). Never-

theless, American courts greatly respect the judgments of a foreign tribunal. In Neely v.
Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109 (1901), the Court upheld an extradition order sending a
U.S. citizen to face criminal charges abroad. The citizen argued that the Constitution
prevented extradition to a jurisdiction which did not recognize and accord American
defendants the full range of constitutional guarantees.
In connection with the above proposition. we are reminded of the fact that the
appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such citizenship does not give him
an immunity to commit crime in other countries, nor entitle him to demand, of
right, a trial in any other mode than that allowed to .s own people by the country whose laws he has violated and from whose itice he has fled. When an
American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot complain if
required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of
that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United States.
Id at 123.

The plaintiff in Cooley v. Weinberger. 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975). challenged the
government's position that her Iranian homicide conviction for the murder of her husband in Iran disqualified her from receiving his social security benefits. The plaintiff
claimed that a number of procedures inconsistent with United States constitutional provisions and privileges, including the use of torture, inadequate legal representation.
inability to c6nfront witnesses, and the absence of a reasonable doubt standard, rendered
the Iranian conviction invalid in the social security case. The court disagreed: -The fact
that Iranian procedures may not be consistent with due process protections guaranteed in
United States criminal proceedings will not in itself prevent effect being given a judgment rendered in Iran in accord with Iranian law." Id at 1155.
"A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction." Wilson v. Girard. 354 U.S. 524. 529 (1957). See also Reid v. Covert. 354 U.S.
1,15 n.29 (1957).
55. CONG. GLObE, 40th Cong.. 2d Sess. 970 (1868) (remarks of Rep. Judd). See also
HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. REPORT ON THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
IN FOREIGN STATES, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. (1868). reprintedin CONG. GLOBE. 40th Cong..
2d Sess. app., at 100 (1868).
56. During a discussion of a preliminary draft of the bill on the Senate floor, the
following exchange occurred:
Mr. Henricks. I wish to ask the Senator from Michigan a question. In the
amendment proposed by him he uses the word -unlawful." In

judging whether the arrest and confinement are unlawful will
that be decided by the laws of this country or by the laws of the
country where the arrest is made? If an arrest should be unjust

and oppressive, and yet be according to the finding of some
grand jury or other proceeding in court, would it be unlawful in
Mr. Howard.

the sense in which the Senator uses the word?
I suppose that the only practical construction to be given to that
word "unlawful" would be this: that the arrest and detention
must be contrary to the laws of nations, contrary to the rights of
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The exhaustion of local remedies doctrine in international law,
however, requires an alien to exhaust all remedies available under
the municipal law of the defendant state before his state may seek
relief before an international tribunal.5 7 This rule, requiring an alien
to seek local redress, flows from a basic respect for the sovereignty
of nations. B
The rule guards against individuals drawing an
unfounded conclusion that the offending state is incapable of doing
justice.5 9 The local courts have the initial opportunity to investigate,
assess, and resolve the dispute. This doctrine recognizes the advantages of quietly resolving disputes on a local level; immediate resort
to an international tribunal may offend the defendant state and
aggravate international relations. 60 Whmie the recent Iranian hostage
crisis does seem a clear instance of unjust detention, and in fact constitutes a violation of international law because of the diplomatic status of the victims, 6 I the nexti.case may not be equally clear. A
an American citizen under the laws of nations. That is the construction which I give to it. and the idea which I had in my
mind.
Co110 GLOBE- 40th Cong.. 2d Sess. 4359 (1868). Judging from the transcript of Congressional debate, the drafters used the terms -unlawful and -unjust" interchangeably.
57 Interhandel Case. [19591 I.CJ. 6. 27; C. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FoR I',JURIE To ALIENS 169-269 (1967); C. LAW. THE LOCAL REMEDIES RUL: IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961). See genera/iy Note. The Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Rule and Forum Non Convenies in InternationalLii'aiion in US.Courts. 13 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 351. 357-64 (1980).
The rule will not necessarily apply to international disputes involving hostages. In
such a case the court may waive the rule if the plaintiff proves a lack of effective local
remedies. Id at 360-61. However, the rule is premised on an- initial respect for the local
tribunal's view of an international dispute, and thus should remind a President to scrutinize thoroughly the imprisoning state's position before creating an international incident
or exercising extraordinary authority in reliance on the statute.
58 C. LAW. spro note 57, at 15; Mummery. he Coena ofthe Duty to Exhaust
Local JudicialRemedies, 58 AM. J.INT'L L. 389. 391 (1964).
59, C. LAW. supra note 57. at 16.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TilE UNITL'D
STA7 IS § 206. Comment a (1965); Mummery. supra note 58. at 391.
61. C. BAUMANN. THE DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS 32 (1973); C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 467-69 (3d ed. rev. 1948); I L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 386-

388 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). Iran is a signatory to the 1961 Vicena Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, done 18 April 1961. 23 U.S.T. 3227. T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U NT-S. 95. Article 22 provides.
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
Article 29 states:
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be ible to
any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person.
freedom or dignity.
In his commentary on this wel-settled principle of international relations one author
notes:
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Presidential decision to disregard a foreign court's determination of
propriety could reduce certainty in international transactions and
sacrifice the international prestige of the United States.62
Because the Hostage Act does not refer the President to a particular body of law, it is reasonable to infer that Congress intended that
he apply a subjective standard of "unjust deprivation of liberty" to
evaluate the unique circumstances surrounding the imprisonment.
Many members of the Fortieth Congress.pointed to the bill's imprecise language on this question and the problems it posed, but the
standardless version of the Act passed over their strenuous objections to this defect. The discretion given the President makes sense.
The unjust capture of American citizens abroad creates an emergency situation-a time when the nation needs decisive executive
action. Limits on Presidential action exist; the President must communicate promptly with Congress. 63 But the initial determination of
The inviolability of the diplomatic agent is certainly the oldest established and
'the most fundamental rule of diplomatic law....
By the end of the sixteenth
century therefore... the inviolability of th ambassador was firmly established
as a rule of customary international law. If... the envoy became involved in
conspiracies against the sovereign of the receiving State, State practice confined
itself to his expulsion. He could on no account be tried or punished.
E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 135 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See also L BLOOMFIELD &
G. FITZGERALD. CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS: PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT 28 (1975).
The application of the United States to the International Court of Justice concerning
the Embassy seizure in Tehran alleged that Iran violated articles 22, 24, 25. 27. 29. 31,
and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done 18 April 1%, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; articles 28, 31, 33. 34, 36. and 40 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done 24 April 1%3. 21 U.S.T. 77. T.I.A.S.
No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Intcrnatiofially Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents, opened for signature 14 December 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.l.A.S. No. 8532; articles 11(4), XIII, XVIII, and XIX of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899. T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284
U.N.T.S. 93; and articles 2 and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. Case Concerning
United States Diolomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, 74 A.M. J. INT'L L. 258 (official

documents supp.) (1980).
The International Court of Justice found that the Islamic Republic of Iran violated
these treaty provisions and the formulations of international law they embodied. Case
Concerning United States Diolomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] L.CJ. Rep. 3
§§ 62-80, 84-92 & 95, reprintedin 74 AM. J. INT'L L 746. 769-81 (1980).
62. The President may utilize a reciprocity standard. He could decide to honor the
foreign determination regarding the propriety of detention only if he is confident that the
foreign state would ho~aor a United States determination involving the detention by
American officials of a -itizen of the foreign state. This proposal, patterned after the
general federal rule governing the validity of foreign civil judgments, ignores the fact that
a foreign country may willingly abide by tt- relatively fair decisions of United States
courts. See note 54 supra and accompanyiz6 teL But see Sangiovanni Hernandez v.
Dominicana de Aviacion C. for A., 556 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1977); Somportex, Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971). cerL denied 405 U.S.
1017 (1972).
63. Congress may, of course, intervene in the decisionmaking process. The Hostage
Act requires prompt communication to Congress of facts relative to the detention. Con-

386

CORNELL INTER.NATIONAL L4W JOURN4L

[Vol. 14:369

unjust deprivation of liberty rests with the President.
2

The Foreign Government Requirement

The Hostage Act vests the Executive with authority to act only
when the unjust deprivation of liberty takes place "by or under the
authority of any foreign government.76 Thus the statute invites the
litigant to challenge the President's characterization of the foreign
captors. The President has no authority to act under the statute if
Americans are held hostage abroad by a terrorist group operating
independently of any foreign government. 6 To justify his reliance
upon the Hostage Act, the Executive m.t show some nexus between
the captors and a foreign government.
The President's task of accurately determining the foreign captor's relationship to a foreign government is made difficult in a hostage situation arising out of civil insurrection, when dejure and de
.kacto governments may co-exist. In a situation when more than one
governmental entity exists, the United States' policy favoring recognition- of the government that is in control of the territory and popgress could by lav pass judgment on the propriety of a particular hostage situation and
approve or limit executive responses. That. however, is a cumbersome process, unsuited
to the prompt action frequently required in hostage situations. A better alternative is for
Congress to amend the statute, provide standards to govern its applicability, and provide
a list of possible proper executive actions. Provisions could be included to require the
President to seek congressional approval within several weeks of all executive actions
undertaken to secure the release of the captured Americans. Cf. The War Powers Resolution. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976). see notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text
(recent legislation incorporating similar provisions).
64. Hostage Act. note 21 supra.
65. Most terrorist groups act without pretense of political- legitimacy: they do not
claim to be organized or ordained as a government. Current examples include the Red
Brigade in Italy and the Baader Meinhof Gang in West Germany. When these
independent groups hold Americans the President may not invoke the Hostage Act. A
terrorist group may, however, assert the status of a.government: The Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) is an example. This raises problems of recognition. See notes
66-67 infta and accompanying texL
At least one sympathetic writer concludes that the P.L.O. functions 'as a territorial
public body":
The PLO. . . has established an unprecedented level of authority and representation. It is exercising typical governmental powers, including taxation.
extradition, obtaining loans, granting governmental guarantees, signing international treaties and cease-fire arrangements, enjoying diplomatic immunities, and
establishing an undisputed claim of status under public international law.
Kassim, The PalestineLiheration Organization'sClaim to Stats. 9 DEN. J. IN'L L 1.32
(1980).
The article concludes: -The.characterization of the PLO as a territorial public body
confers upon it the status of a participant in international law. Having a status, the
P.L.O. necessarily possesses certain tights and obligationsunder iternaionallaw- I'd at
33 (emphasis added).
66. "Recognition is indisputably the President's sole responsibility, and for many it is
an 'enumerated' power implied in the President's express powers to appoint and receive
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ulation 67 may clarify the foreign government's role in the detention,
but difficulties still abound. A competing government, not recognized by the United States, may take American hostages. The President might withhold recognition of the offending government, but
still wish to rely on the Hostage Act to secure the release of the captives. If a United States court hearing a challenge to the President's
action held the Hostage Act inapplicable because of the nonrecognition of the foreign government, it might frustrate the drafters'
68
intent.
On the other hand, the President might recognize a government
not otherwise entitled to recognition merely because he wished to
invoke the Hostage Act in order to secure the release of hostages
held by that government. A challenge to Presidential action on the
ground that recognition was improper, and that no true government
was involved in the detention, would embroil the court in a foreign
affairs controversy concerning an area traditionally left to executive
discretion. 69 The best approach is to respect the recognition decision
of the President, absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 70
Ambassadors." HENKIN. supra note 26. at 178. See generaly RESTATEMENT (Sc oND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§

94-98 (1965).

67. The general policy of the United States since Washington's time has been to recognize any government "which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially
declared." I J. MOORE. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 43 (1906) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson).
We maintain diplomatic relations with many governments of which we do not
necessarily approve. The reality is that, in this day and age. coups and other
unscheduled changes of government are not exceptional developments. Withholding diplomatic relations from these regimes, after they have obtained effective control, penalizes us. It means that we forsake much of the chance to
influence the attitudes and conduct of a new regime. Without relations, we forfeit opportunities to transmit our values and communicate our policies. Isolation
may well bring out the worst in the new government.
Address by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher delivered at Occidental College (June II, 1977), reprinted in L. HENKiN, R. PUGH. 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (1980). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 100-103 (1965). The President will refuse recogni-

tion, however, if unconvinced that a revolutionary regime -is willing to carry out the
obligations of the state under international law and applicable international agreements." Id § 103.
68. It is clear from the legislative debate that the drafters wanted to give the President broad authority to rescue captive Americans wherever they might be detained:
We should have an act not only declaring to the nations of the world our determination to maintain in all instances and in all countries the rights and immunities of American citizens, home born and foreign born alike, but a legislative
injunction laying upon the Executive the command of Congress that all the powers, every prerogative that he can wield under the Constitution and laws of the
country, should be exerted in the case of the humblest citizen who might be
detained anywhere upon any pretext.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4355 (1868) (remarks of Sen. Conkling).
69. For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see notes 30-45 supra and
accompanying text.
70. See note 84 infra and accompanying text.
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Another troublesome situation may arise if the correctly identifled and recognized foreign government insists that it did not authorize the detention of the American citizens and assures the President
that it is attempting to secure their release. If the President invoked
the Act in these circumstances he would, in effect, be rejecting the
foreign government's disclaimer of responsibility?'1 Where an individual challenges Presidential action under the Act, the court should
require the Executive to produce some evidence of foreign government involvement. Failure to impose such a burden places the
American courts in the difficult position of relying solely on the
Executive's allegations that the foreign government had falsely disclaimed responsibility. While the President retains primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, he must exercise caution
before he asks the judiciary to find bad faith on the part of a foreign
71 State responsibility law will hold the state accountable in cases where the government fails to show the degree of diligence in the protection of foreigners that circumstances ,arrant. Public status of the foreigner may force the host to exercise a greater
degree of care. Failure to detect and punish the responsible private individuals will also
make the state responsible F. GARCIA-AMADOR. L. SoiiN & R. BAXTER. RECENT CODIFIATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 29 (1974).
These standards attach responsibility to a state's failure to act. These formulations
differ from the test of the Hostage Act because they do not require proof that the state
controlled or endorsed wrongful conduct against foreigners by private individuals. This
pnnciple is codified inarticle 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
done 18 Apni 1961, 23 US.T. 3227. T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 500 U.N.T.S. 95. which require
the receiving state to take "all appropriate steps" to protect diplomats.
The International Court of Justice held the Government of Iran accountable for its
failure to protect and assist the American delegation before and during the armed takeover of the embassy.
The facts, set out . . establish to the satisfaction of the Court that on 4
November 1979 the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any "appropriate steps" to protect the premises. staff and archives of the United States' mission
against attack by the militants, and to take any steps either to prevent this attack.
or to stop itbefore itreached its
completion. . . [The failure of the Iranian
Government to take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or lack of
appropriate means.
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. 119801 L.CJ.
Rep. 3 § 63. reprinted in 74 AM. J.INT'L L. 746. 769 (1980).
The United States did not suggest to the court that the militants "when they executed
their attack on the Embassy. had any form of official status as recognized 'agents' or
organs of the Iranian State." Id § 58. But the court blamed the Iranian government for
its subsequent failure to seek a prompt end to the seizure and its open endorsement of the
militants' conduct. Id § 70.
The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of
the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated the continuing
occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State.
The militants, authors of the invasion and jailers of the hostages. had now
become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible.
Id § 74.
See generally Lillich & Paxman. State Responsibdik)' For Injuries To .41iens Occasioned
&yTerrorist.ctiities. 26 AM. U.L.R. 217 (1977).
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government. 72
B.

I.

CHALLENGING THE NATURE OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
UNDER THE ACT

Permissible 4clions

Assuming arguendo that the President properly relied on the
Hostage Act, a plaintiff may challenge the Executive's action under
the Act as overbroad. The Hostage Act authorizes the President to
"use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think
necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release [of United
States citizens]." 73 Strictly construed, the Hostage Act only authorizes the President to 'take direct action against the offending nation.
This is a reasonable construction because Congress and the courts
have left the President unfettered in matters of foreign affairs. 74 The
President's discretion in the field of foreign affairs does not, however,
limit his ability to employ domestic measures to secure the release of
captured Americans. 75 The language of the statute invites a broad
construction, and the legislative history shows that the Fortieth Congress contemplated domestic-oriented executive action when it
72. See also note 51 supra.
73. Hostage Act, note 21 supra.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936):
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senatebut he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude.
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshalflsaid in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, 'he President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613.
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power. but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal government in the field of international
relations--a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, but which of course, like every other 'governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Id at 319-20.
See also HENKIN, supra note 26, at 37-65: "Students of American government, and
citizens generally know that American foreign relations are in the charge of the President. Foreign governments believe that it is principally he who determines American
policy towards them." Id at 37; E_ CORWIN. THE PRESIDErr OFFICE AND POWERS
1787-1948, at 273-74 (1948).
75. To protect other Amei-cans, and to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian government, President Carter relied on the Hostage Act to limit travel to Iran by American
citizens by restricting the use of United States passports. Exe= Order No. 12,211, Fed.
Reg. 26,685 (1980). The Attorney General's regulation imposing special visa requirements on Iranian nonimmigrant students also had a significant domestic impact. 8
C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980). See notes 113-16 intfa and accompanying text.
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The President expressly relied on the Hostage Act during the
Iranian crisis when he imposed a ban on travel to Iran by American
nationals. 77 Although no case has squarely presented the issues, the
weight of judicial authority suggests that the President act.d within
the scope of his delegated authority, and that a challenge to the Iranian travel ban (or one imposed under similar circumstances) will
fail. Courts have most frequently discussed the Hostage Act in the
context of a President's attempt to restrict international travel by
United States citizens.78 In those cases the courts recognized that the
Hostage Act would impose an obligation on the President to rescue
Americans who might be captured while travelling abroad. Therefore, the courts reasoned that the Executive had the authority to
refuse passports for travel to any country where hostages might be
taken. On these and other grounds, the Supreme Court upheld the
9
Department of State restriction on travel to Castro's Cuba.'
76 As reported out of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the bill empowered
the Presidcnt "to order the arrest and to detain incustody any subject or citizen of such
lorcign Government -who may be found within the jurisdiction of the United States

..

HOUSE COMM

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. REPORT ON THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAN

CzII1-.s 1% FOR'EIGN STATES, 40th Cong.

IstSess. (1868). repriniedin CONG. GLOBE.
40th Cong., 2d Sess,. app.. at 100 (1868). The House bill included identical language.
Co'-, GtoBE, 40th Cong.. 2d Setss. 2318 (1868) A Senate amendment substituted the
..necessary and proper" clause for the more specific arrest power. Id at 4359 (1868).
Though members of both houses severely criticized giving the President a reprisal power.
fee note 109 rnfta. nowhere does it appear that Congress objected to the arrest power
because it was a domestic rather than an international exercise of Presidential authority.
Nothing in the legislative history challenges the conclusion that Congress intended the
Executie to act both at home and abroad to secure the release of captive Americans.
77. See note 8 supra.
78 Zemel v,.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965): Worthy v. Herier. 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.).
,erl dented 361 U.S. 918 (1959). Bnehl v. Dulles. 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957). rey'd
nib nom- Kent v. Dulles. 357 U.S 116 (1958); Shachtman v.Dulles. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C.
('ir
1955)- Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.). a i'dsub nom. Agee v. Muskie. 629
F 2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980). reV'dsub noi. Haig v. Agee. 49 U.S.LW. 4869 (1981); Narenji
SCivilettli. 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1979). res'dV 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied.
lIO S. Ct. 2928 (1980); Redpath v. Kissinger. 415 F.Supp. 566 (W.D. Tex.). a'd. 545
F 2d 167 (5th Cir. 1976): MacEwan v. Rusk. 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.Pa. 1964). aff'd 344
F 2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965).
79 It also cannot be forgotten that in the early days of the Castro regime. United
States citizens were arrested and imprisoned without charges. We think, particularly in view of the President's statutory obligation to -use such means, not
amounting to acts of war. as he may think necessary and proper" to secure the
release of an American citizen unjustly deprived of his liberty by a foreign government. that the Secretary has justifiably concluded that travel to Cuba by
American citizens might involve the Nation in dangerous international incidents.
and that the Constitution does not require him to validate passports for such
travel.
Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. at 15 (1965) (footnote omitted). Similar logic pervades other
cases permitting the President to restrict travel to Communist countries. In Worthy v.
Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959). the court noted the President's powers aud responsibility under the Hostage Act and concluded that. "his power in respect to foreign affairs
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The courts also have had the opportunity to test the breadth of
Presidential power under the Hostage Act in litigation arising out of
the executive agreement that resulted in the release of the hostages
from Iran. A number of the Executive's responses to the Iranian
takeover were grounded on dhe more specific provisions of other
laws."', President Carter did, however, rely in part on the Hostage
Act for authority to reach agreement with Iran. 8 1 Although the Presincludes power tb refuse to sanction the travel of American citizens in that [dangerousl
area." Id at 911
In Briehl v. Dulles. 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957) rey'd sub nomt Kent v. Dulies. 357
U.S. 116 (1958). the challenged regulations prohi.',ed issuance of passports to Communist Party members. In upholding the regulation. the court observed that. "while a passport as such does not bestow rights of protection which a citizen does not otherwise have.
it does, as a permit to travel abroad, allow him to put himself in a position where he may
invoke the protective'power of this government." Id at 568.
80. Exec. Order No. 12.205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980): Exec. Order No. 12.211. 45
Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980). See note 7 supra.
8 I. In that controversial settlement, the President agreed to release the frozen Iranian
assets and transfer the funds into escrow accounts held in the name of the Algerian Central Bank. The President also agreed to terminate all litigation against ]ran then pending
in American courts, and to promote the settlement of those claims. Exec. Order Nos.
12,279-85, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (1981). Upon taking office, President Reagan ratified
the Agreement. Exec. Order No. 12,294.46 Fed. Reg. 14.11 (1981). See generally Note.
PresidentialAuthorit, to Terminate Domestic Suits Against Foreign Governments.- An
Analtsis of the Hostage Agreement, 15 CORNELL I NT'L L.J. - (1981).
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4969 (1981). the Supreme Court upheld
Presidential suspension of the claims. In doing so, it provided 'the most comprehensive
judicial discussion of the Hostage Act to date.
Thp Court's opinion. written by Justice Rehnquist concludes that the Hostage Act did
not specifically authorize the President's actions. It interprets very narrowly the Act's
legislative intent and history, and concluded that
the Act was passed in response to a situation unlike the recent Iranian crisis.
Congress in 1868 was concerned with the activity of certain countries refusing to
recognize the citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, and repatriating such citizens against their will. .. . These countries were not interested in
returning the citizens in exchange for any sort of ransom. This also explains the
reference in the Act to imprisonment "in violation of the rights of American
citizenship." Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated international law and
common decency, the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize
their American citizenship-they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship.
Id. at 4975 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
This slim distinction is unworthy of the congressional purpose underlying the Act.
While the immediate impetus for its adoption was certainly to protect naturalized Americans visiting their native countries, see note 52 supra, the Congress chose not to limit the
language of the Act to foreign born Americans; its protection extends to "any citizen of
the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 1732. Cases whlch recognize that the Hostage Act gives
the President extra authority to limit international travel have never restricted the Hostage Act's coverage to protection of naturalized Americans. See note 78 supra.
The Dames d Moore opinion does, however, read expansively both the Hostage Act
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp.
11 1978):
We think both statutes highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action ... . The Hostage Act
. . .indicates congressional willingness that the President have broad discretion
when responding to the hostile acts of foreign sovereigns.
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ident is made airbiter of the appropriateness of action under the Act

("as he may think necessary and proper"),8 it is unlikely that he will
be able to act entirely without judicial supervision-5 3 As an initial
requirement, the President would have to show a link between his
action and the goal of the Hostage Act: the release of hostages. A
challenge to action under the Hostage Act will succeed if the President can not prove that the action in question bore some rational
relation to the goal of obtaining the release of the hostages. The
fortuity of Americans captured abroad will not give the President
carte blanche to evade the legislative process by simply claiming that
what he did was necessary and proper to secure the hostages' release.
The President's choice of action is entitled to great respect; the
"rational basis" test is easily satisfied. 4 Such a test does not require
[W~e cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area
in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least with the
acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to
take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, -especially . . . in the areas of foreign
rolicy and national security." imply -congressional disapproval- of action taken
y the Exoutive.
49 U S.L.W. at 4975 (citing Haig v. Agee. 49 U.S.L.W. 4869 (1981)).

82 Hostage Act, note 21 szira.
83. For Adiscussion of the political question "d justiciability doctrines. see notes 2645 supra and accompanying text.
84. In general, the rational basis test resolves in favor of the challenged action. It
respects the exercise of discretion by the administrative or executive decisionmaker by
preventing a substitution of the court's judgment in most cases. See -eneraly K. DAvIS,
ADMINsT'RnVE LAw TEXT §§ 30.04-.06 (1972). In this respect, it is similar to the abuse
of discretion standard suggested to review the President's unjust deprivation conclusion
and foreign government characterization. See notes 46-71 szpra and accompanying text.
Both tests place heavy burdens on the challenger. This is entirely appropriate, however.
given the strong arguments which favor executive preeminence in these type of questions.
See notes 30-45 supra and accompanying text.
In such areas as foreign policy and military activity, some issues seem clearly
inappropriate for judicial determination. But even in such areas, reviewability
may depend upon what administrative failure is asserted, for courts are normally
less reluctant to decide constitutionality, statutory interpretaton, or fairness of
procedure than they are to decide whether the action is arbitrary or capricious or
an abuse ofdicretio . . . . [Tlhe disqualification of judges on issues of military
and foreign policy may be so strongly felt that judges will decline even to pass
upon constitutional issues.... Even so, if the President and Congress are
exceeding their constitutional power and depriving the plaintiff of his liberty.
might not the courts have the responsibility to decide no matter how difficult the
constitutional question might be?
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT. § 28.05 (1972) (emphasis added).

The two tests (rational relation and abuse of discrelkmy are likely to yield similar
results and are well-suited to the issues and decisions being reviewed. The rational basis
test is easier to apply in testing whether the President has taken extraordinary action that
could not possibly lead to the release of the hostages. It is easier to apply because it
focuses the analysis on the ultimate cause and effect relation: could the challenged action
in any rational way be considered necessary and proper" to obtain or effectuate the
release? A decision by the President allegedly under the Hostage Act, to raise taxes without congressional approval, for example, would likely fail this rational relation test-
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the court to satisfy itself that the challenged executive action was in
fact necessary and proper to effectuate the release. The court must
only conclude that the President had a rational basis for so deciding.
This is the most appropriate test to accomodate, yet still control,
Congress' broad delegation of Presidential power under the Act.81
2.

The Acts of War Prohibition

The one explicit limit to Presidential action under the Hostage
Act forbids the use of means "amounting tp acts of war." The statute does not define "acts of war" and the legislative history of the
Hostage Act reflects considerable controversy about the kinds of
executive action that fall within the prohibition. 7 International law
authorities prominent in the nineteenth century defined "acts of
war" narrowly. 88 Modem writers are in accord: "War must not be
confused with certain acts of force used by States in difficult diploConversely, the question whether the President has properly characterized the imprisonment as "by or under the authority of any foreign government" does not lend itself to
causal analysis. Foreign government decisions (when they are reviewable. see note 40
supra) lie in the discretion of the President. Thus, the appropriate consideration is
whether he has abused that discretion.
85. "He is to do all he can under the Constitution and laws in every way to secure the
release of a citizen.
... CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4333 (1868) (remarks of
Sen. Williams); Ud at 4208 (remarks of Sen. Conness).
86. Hostage Act, note 21 supra.
87. It is quite clear that the Fortieth Congress never intended to yield to the President
its constitutional power to declare war. "The Constitution provides that Congress alone
shall declare war, and Congress cannot, if it would, delegit'e this power." CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 2d Sess. 967 (1868) (remarks of Rep. Bailey).
I am no: in favor of lodging the war power in the hands of any President. least
of all in the hands of the man now discharging the duties of that office [Andrew
Johnson]. . . . Congress is clothed by thei Constitution with the war-making
power of the nation, and if it becomes necessary to vindicate the rights of American citizens and maintain the honor of the Government by a declaration of war I
am sure Congress will ng shrink from its duty. The rights of American citizens,
native-born or naturalized, and the honor of the American Government, are far;
safer in the keeping of Congress than in the keeping of any President.
Id at 1102 (remarks of Rep. Ashley)..
Many members, however, understood the law of nations to permit a wide variety of
measures short of war to resolve international disputes. The s onsors of the bill in both
houses expressed the opinion that many unfriendly acts did not rise to the level of -acts
of war." They specifically mentioned reprisals against resident aliens, suspension of diplomatic and commercial intercourse between the nations, blockade, and embaigo. Id at
2314 (remarks of Rep. Banks); id at 4207 (remarks of Sen. Conness); id. at 4359 (remarks
of Sen. Howard); i at 4354 (remarks of Sen. Ferry). But other members argued forcefully that these strong measures were "acts of war." Id at 4205 (remarks of Sen. Sumner).
88. Among the various modes of terminating thic differences between nations, by
forcible means short of actual war, are the following:
1. By laying an embargo or sequestration on the ships and goods, or other
property of the offending nation, found within the territory of the injured State.
2. By taking forcible possession of the thing in controversy, by securing to
yourself by force, and refusing to the other nation, the enjoyment of the right
drawn in question.

394

CORNELL INTEN,4TIONAL L4-0*JOURNAL

[VoL 14:369

matic negotiations in order to bring pressure to bear on the other
party and to make it accept its demands more rapidly; for example,
rerrisals, seizures, temporary occupation of territory, peaceful blockade, embargo."8' 9 This category includes many of the actions
ordered by the President to effectuate the release of the Americans
held in Iran.9

The limitation on "acts of war" must, however, be read in light
of the War Powers Resolution. 9 1 That Resolution, enacted over veto
in 1973. represents a congressional effort to reassert control over the
use of Amercian armed forces.9 2 The law requires the President "'in

every possible instance" to consult with Congress before introducing
troops into hostilities, 93 and to report promptly to Congress the
details of the use of armed forces.

"

The Hostage Act, to the extent it

permits use of the armed forces, does not relax these requirements of
3 By exercising the right of vindictive retaliation (retorsiofacti) or of amicable retaliation (retorsion de droot); by which last the one nation applies, in its
transactions with the other, the same rule of conduct by which that ot. er is governed under similar circumstances.
4 By making reprisals upon the persons and things belonging to the offendIng nation, until a satisfactory reparation is made for the alleged injury.
H WIHEATON. ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 505-06 (2d ann. ed. W. Lawrence
1863) (footnote omitted); E. VA-r'EL THE LAW OF NATIONS 282-89 (4th Am. ed. J. Chit-

IN 1835) The legislators referred to the work and principles of Vattel and Wheaton
dunng the debate on the Hostage Act. CONG. GLOBE. 40th Cong.. 2d Sess. 4206 (1868)
(remarks of Sen. Sumner). 8 J.VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVrE 37-48 (1976) contains supportive histoncal examples.
89. J EPPSTEIN. CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 114 (1953). reprinted M L.
ORFIELD & E RE. CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 898 (rev. ed. 1965).
See also 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952)
(retorsion. reprisals (including embargo), pacific blockade, and intervention): 2 C.C.
H-v mI).INTERNATIONAL LAW 1654-78 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (withdrawal of diplomatic relations. retorsion. retaliation, reprisals, pacific blockade, embargo. noninterourse.
increases. or decreases in national armaments).

90. The President placed severe restrictions on the exchange of goods with Iran
(excepting food. clothing and medical supplies). and on other terms of trade with enterpnses controlled by the Iranian government. Exec. Order No. 12.205. 45 Fed. Reg.
24.099 ( 980); Exec. Order No. 12.211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980). Several politicians
advocated the use of a blockade or harbor-mining operation to pressure Iran. N.Y.
Times, March 20, 1980. at A8, col. 1; id,Apr. 24, 1980. at A25. coL 1.
91. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976).
Emerson. The / r Powers Resolution Tested- The Presidextr Independent Defense
Poket. 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 187 (1975), provides an exhaustive analysis of the War
Powers Resolution and argues for broad executive defense powers.
92. The announced purpose of the War Powers Resolution is to

fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations.
50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1976).
93. Id § 1542.

94. Id § 1543.
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the Resolution. More fundamentally, though, the Resolution
declares the President incapable of involving troops in actual or
imminent hostilities absent a declaration of war, an attack on the
United States, or a specific statutory authorization. 9 5 Moreover, the
Resolution contains language that restricts reliance upon existing
statutes as grounds for the use of armed forces. The earlier statute
must "specifically authorize" the introduction of troops;96 the Hostage Act contains no such authorization. Reading the Hostage Act
and War Powers Resolution together, a court will reasonably conclude that the President may not rely upon the Hostage Act to support introduction of armed forces into hostilities. 97
95. Id § 1541(c).
At least one writer makes the argument that § 1541(c) is not a legally binding codificanon of the President's constitutional power in situations involving hostilities. One may
view it as merely a congressional policy statement without frustrating the primary legislative purpose of the Resolution: to establish a process of collective judgment between the
Congress and the Executive in time of crisis. Emerson, The War Powrs Resolution
Tested- The President'sIndependent Defense Po)er, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 187. 191-92
(1975).
96. Interpretation of joint resolution-nferences from any law or treaty
(a) Authority to intioduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before November
7, 1973), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act. unless
such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
this chapter. ...
50 U.S.C. §.1547 (1976).
97. In the wake of the aborted attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran. some
Congressmen questioned whether the President violgted the War Powers Resolution by
failing to consult with Congress before undertaking the mission. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25.
1980, at Al, col- 6; id, Apr. 26, 1980, at All, col. I.
The President may justify the use of troops to rescue captured Americans. In the spccific circumstances surrounding the Iranian crisis, the President might successfully argue
that the War Powers Resolution authorized the rescue mission because the militants'
attack on the American Embassy was an attack on a "possession" of the United States
within the meaning of§ 1541(c). See 1 L OPPENH IM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 461.794-95
(8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
The President may also find support in the views of some commentators who read
much into the few textual grants of authority in the Constitution: the -Commander in
Chief" clause, U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; the -take care" clause, id art. II, § 3; the treaty
power, i art. II, § 2, and the power to receive Ambassadors, id art- II. § 3. These writers assume that the President possesses a deep reservoir of necessary but unarticulated
executive powers: "ft]he Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." Id art. 11. This is particularly true in matters of war and relations
with other nations. Alexander Hamilton wrote:
While, therefore, the legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually
transfer the nation from a state of peace to a state of hostility, it belongs to the
"executive power" to do whatever else the law of nations, cooperating with the
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CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE EXECUTIVE ACTION

Even assuming the broadest possible delegation of authority by
Congress to the President, a litigant may challenge the constitutionality of the President's actions under the Hostage Act. The Constitution remains the ultimate check to which a court may resort to
protect individual rights from majoritarian fervor.
Courts will continue to safeguard individual rights even though
the government asserts a countervailing need to conduct foreign
relations. 9 Andrew Hamilton's visicn of unrestricted national
power in foreign affairs has never become law." But, as Professor
Henkin's analysis reveals, invocation of the foreign relations power
has tended to make the judiciary especially sympathetic to the constitutional and statutory propriety of executive action100
Cases of national emergency compel even greater deference by
the judicial branch. For, while emergency does not permit deviation
from the Constitution, it certainly provides justification for pressing
the document to its limits. This view is well illustrated in Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell i0 To determine the constitreaties of the countri,

enjoin in the intercourse of the United States with foreign

powers.
A.

HAMILTON & J. MADISON. LETrERs or P-,CIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS ON TIlE PRO( LA-

1793 14 (1845). See. e.g.. A. SOFAER. WAR. FORF.IGN
ArFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 1-6 (1976). Adopting this view of executive
pocr. the President may argue that be possesses authority to deploy troops as a matter
of constitutional right. The language of the War Powers Resolution lends this argument
considerable force: "Nothing in this chapter (1) is intended to alter the constitutional
AITION OF NEUTRALiTY OF

authonty of the Congress or of the President ....

.

50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1976). This

theory is most persuasive; when U.S. armed forces act to rescue endangered Americans.
rathcr than to attack foregn troops. Emerson. The War Powers Resolution Tested- The
President's ndrependent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 187. 192 (1975). But see
Berger. ProtectionofAmericans Abroad. 44 U. CiN. L REV. 741. 744 (1975). which inter-

prets narrowly the President's -implied- constitutional authority to commit troops unilaterally and construes his Hostage Act powers restrictively.
98. In Afroyim v. Rush, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967). the Courtstruck down a provision of the immigration statute which provided that a naturalized American citizen
would lose his citizenship if he voted in a foreign election. The Court held that the
fourteenth amendment controlled the status of citizenship and that Congress had no
power to cancel citizenship. The Court in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1. 6-7. 16-17 (1957).
reversed court martial convictions of armed forces' dependents living abroad because of
the failure to provide trial by jury. The Court recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty. See generally HENKIN. supra note 26. at 251-70.
99. As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for casualties
and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned, the power of making
that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation
and the resources of the community.
THE FEDERALIST. No. 31. (A. Hamilton) (Heirloom Edition at 194-95).
100. HENKIN. supra note 26. at 205-24.

101. 290 U.S 398 (1934).
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tutionality of a state statute passed as an emergency economic measure during the Great Depression, the Court held that the textually
specific provisions of the Constitution cannot be set aside to meet
exigencies. However, the constitutional provisions that are written
loosely, in general language, are more elastic; they can be "'stretched" to justify questionable emergency action. 10 2 The framers of the
Constitution were confident that the document would serve the
nation well in times of both peace and conflict. t0 3 One writer, dissatisfied with this view, argues a most difficult case---that certain situations justify laying aside the Constitution, even its specific and
immutable provisions, to permit the President to exercise his prerogative to save the nation.1t He argues that when the ultimate purpose of the Constitution-preservation of the nation-is threatened,
102. Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or
reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its
grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of
the States were determined in the light of emergency and they are not altered by
emergency. What power was thus granted and what limitations were thus
imposed are questions which have always been, and always will be, the subject of
close examination under our constitutional system.
While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion
for the exercise of power. . . . The constitutional question presented in the light
of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise
of it in response to particular conditions. Thus, the war power of the Federal
Government is not created by the emergency of war, but it is a power given to
meet that emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits
the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort
to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional
limitations safeguarding essential liberties. When the provisions of the Constitution. in grant or restriction, are specific, so particularlized as not to admit of
construction, no question is presented. Thus, emergency would not permit a
State to have more than two Senators in the Congress, or permit the election of
President by a general popular vote without regard to the number of electors to
which the States are respectively entitled, or permit the States to -coin money"
or to "make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts."
But where constitutional grants and limitations of power are set forth in general
clauses, which afford a broad outline, the process of construction is essential to
fill in the details. Id at 425-26 (footnote omitted).
103. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 26, 28, 71 (A. Hamilton), 41 (J. Madison).
104. See Hurtgen, The CaseforPresideniaiPrerogative,7 U. Tot L REV. 59 (1975).
Hurtgen also suggests that the framers might have felt that they had drafted, in effect,
two constitutions: one for times of war, and another for times of peace. Under this view,
any Presidential action taken in time of emergency would be constitutional; even if it
violated the terms of the peacetime document, the action could pass muster under the
wartime Constitution. Id-at 64 n.17. The behavior of past Presidents provides some
support for this view. Lincoln, for example, enlarged the Army and Navy, ordered private appropriations, proclaimed a naval blockade of Southern ports, and suspended
habeas corpus, all without congressional approval. E CORWIN, THE PRESIDENTr
OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1948, at 277-78 (1948). The Court upheld the blockade action
in the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); the habeas corpus suspension, condemned by the Court in Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 1 (1866), still resulted in
pragmatic victory for Lincoln's broad conception of his wartime authority.
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the C-)nstitution itself must yieldI °s
As a practical matter, however, the kinds of incidents that bring
the Hostage Act into operation wi rarely, if ever, rise to a level of
emergency which threatens the continued existence of the nation.
especially since the dir&t harm wiU take place abroad.106
No Hostage Act power may be exerted so as to violate rights the
Constitution guarantees. It is far better to adhere to the approach
employed in Blaisdell, 107 than to suspend the Constitution. it is wiser
to err on the side of constitutionality, giving the President the benefit
of judicial doubt, than to assert that an action is unconstitutonal but
still permissible. This means that a reviewing court cannot approve
executive action which ' contravenes some "specific." "particularized"10 provision of the Constitution, no matter how clear the case
of the President that what he has done is "necessary and proper"
within the meaning of the Hostage Act. Congress may not by statute
amend or abridge clear constitutional rights.
Some cases will involve violations of textually secured rights
and will require invalidation of the challenged action. No court
would ignore the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the
eighth ameidment and refuse to vindicate the rights of someone tortured (at the President's request) to acquire information necessary to
secure the release of Americans imprisoned abroad. The sponsor of
the Hostage Act in the House argued the soundness of his bill, which
passed and went to the Senate containing express authorization for
the President to arrest citizens of the imprisoning nation passing
through the United States."' That language was omitted when the
105. There are many practical reasons for giving total authority to a President: one
man acts faster and with greater precision; the Executive possesses the most reliable
information necessary for decision. the President is most easily held accountable: the
Congress can later impeach him. Hungen. supra note 104. at 75. This theory is dangerous. Once the President lays aside the Constitution. no standard remains to tell him
where to stop.
106 Notwithstanding that the Executive orders issued during the Iranian hostage crisis contained explicit declarations of a state of emergency. See notes 7-8 supra The term
"emergency" is thus often used as shorthand expression to refer generally to circumstances where a strong national interest demands swift and decisive action. Seizure of
the American Embassy in Tehran did not jeopardize the polity, or even seriously impair
the quality of life led by the American people. Yet the episode opened an extraordinary
chapter in the Nation's history. The seizure was a central topic in national and international journalism. It profoundly affected the foreign relations ef the United States. and
increased the chance of hostilities. No court could fail to recognize the st;-Dng national

interest in resolving the standoff.
107. 290"U.S. 398 (1934).

108. Id at 426.
109. The sponsor. Rep. Banks, attempted to repel a number of constitutional assaults.
Critics thought the measure a violation of the fourth, fifth. and thincenth amendments.
and the privilege of habeas corpus. Mr. Banks thought those principles inapplicable:
'[W]hatever individual is arrested under this statute 'will not be arrested because of any
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Senate inserted the "necessary and proper" language now in the
law. 110 This deletion shows that Congress did not include the reprisal arrest power in its otherwise generous delegation. But even if
Congress had enacted the Hostage Act in the form in which it passed
the House, the reprisal power would not have been.valid.11 1
When, however, "constitutional grants and limitations of power
are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline," '3 2 the
judiciary may adopt a policy of greater flexibility responsive to the
exigencies of the hostage detention. The standard of review should
change to reflect the emergency and extraordinary state interest.
This is especially true in due process and equal protection balancing
controversies. A recent case growing out of the Iranian seizure provides a useful illustration. In Narenji v. Civileti, "1 a group of Iranians in the United States brought suit to enjoin the government from
discriminatory visa enforcement on the basis of nationality. The district court enjoined the procedure, finding it a denial of the students'
right to equal protection of the laws. The trial court's opinion considered the Hostage Act, recognized that it applied on the facts, but
held that the Hostage Act could not grant the President any authority to infringe individual rights.' 14 The court of appeals reversed.
offense commited by him. It is the assertion of the sovereign power of this Government
to enforce the rights of its citizens against other Governments.- CONG. GLOBE. 40th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 2314 (1868) (remarks of Rep. Banks).
There is no connection between the rights of persons under the criminal law or
the provisions of the Constitution relating to criminal law and the powers of a
Government in a case of this kind. The question is broader, more extended than
anything relating to the rights of persons under the Constitution. whether citizens
or aliens. It is the question whether the Government of the United States has the
power to take any action whatever to compel the Government of other countries
to consider the rights of our citizens and to bring the matter to negotiation and
settlement.
Id at 2315.
110. See note 7 6 supra-

11I. The reprisal arrest power ran afoul of too many explicit constitutional provisions
to survive. This explains Rep. Banks' attempts to justify the measure by resort to a theory of extra-constitutional overeignty. It is difficult to imagine a scenario of foreign
detention so threatening to the Constitution that it would justify the exercise of power at
odds with the Constitution. But see notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text.
112. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
113. 481 F. Supp. !132 (D.D.C.).re'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979). cerl. denied 100
S.Ct. 2928 (1980).
114. Recognizing that discrimination among aliens on the basis of national origin is
not per se unconstitutional, the court conceded that Congress could make such a classification or authorize the President to do so. 481 F. Supp. at 1141. But. noting that
"throughout the statutory scheme governing immigration and naturalization, Congress
has been very explicit in those instances when it desired that a particular group of aliens
be treated in a manner different from others," the opinion concluded it could "find no
statutory basis for the discriminatory classification established by the regulation such that
defendants could cloak their rule's discriminatory effect in the mantle of congressional
approval under its power over immigration and naturalization and thereby for practical
purposes, exempt the regulation from judicial scrutiny." Id (footnote omitted).
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Although the court of appeals did not ground its opinion on the Hostage Act, it did recognize that the emergency shifted the equal protection balance in favor of the propriety of the discriminatory visa
procedure. The court accepted without challenge the governmnent's
affidavit that the regulations in question were part of the President's
plan to secure release of the hostages.I" The court was wrong not to
have placed definite reliance on the Hostage Act. In a concurring
opinion, Judge MacKinnon correctly read the congressional delegation made in the Hostage Act to include the visa procedure under
examination.' ,6
The court failed, however, to balance properly the equal protection claim of the plaintiffs with the overwhelming intcrest of the country in obtaining release of the American
diplomats held in Iran:
In essence, although defendants' regulation is an understandable effort designed
to somehow reply to the Iranian attack upon this nation's sovereignty and the
seizure of its citizens, it is one that does not support a legitimate national interest'
and therefore would not excuse the wholesale nullification of the rights of the
students involved or save [the regulation] from violating the equal protection
guarantee of the fifth amendment.
Id at 1145 (footnote omitted).
In its searh for statutory authorization for the classification, the court focused narrowly on the immigration statutes, giving the clear mandate of the Hostage Act short
shrift
We note that Congress has not been totally silent on the subject of the President's
duty to free any American citizen unjustly imprisoned overseas, for it has
declared that "the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen.
and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President
shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war. as he may think necessary
and proper to obtain or effectuate the release . . - ." 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
While the'defendants have made a passing reference to this enactment, they do
not rely' upon it as a congressional endorsement of their actions, apparently
believing, as does the Courft. that while it may give the President some extra
latitude to deal militarily or economically with a foreign nation holding American citizens, it does not act to authorize the Chief Executive to abrogate individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id at 1141 n. 7 .
The quoted section highlights the error committed by the district court in dismissing
out of hand the applicability of the Hostage Act. It is plain that the Act does not and
cannot "authorize the Chief Executive to abrogate individual rights guaranteed by the
Constitution." See note 107 supra and accompanying text. However. when the rights
asserted are not clearly delimited by the express text of the Constitution, the extent of the
protection afforded must depend bn the surrounding circumstances and conflicting interests. Equal protection is such a variable right: its scope is set by reasoned balancing of
opposing interests. The district court failed to weigh in the balance the strong national
interest in allowing the President to devise a variety of responses to the Iranian seizure.
115. This court is not in a 'position to say what effect the required reporting by
several thousand Iranian students, who may be in this ountry illegally, will have
on the attitude and conduct of the Iranian government. That is a judgment to be
made by the President and it is not for us to overrule him. in the absence of acts
that are clearly in excess of his authority.
Narcnji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d at 748.
116. It is also incorrect to say "that the President has taken this action without
express authorization from Congress".. . In the situation with which we are
here dealing, the President's power is at its zenith-right up to the brink of war
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Travel restrictions are also subject to constitutional scrutiny. In
a case where the Executive refuses to issue a passport to an individual, or when he imposes an area travel ban, the court hearing a challenge to the action must balance the individual's fifth amendment
liberty interest against the security interest of the nation)' 7 In Zemel
;,. Rusk, "" the Court held that the Secretary of State was statutorily
and constitutionally authorized under the Passport Act of 1926' 19 to
restrict travel to Castro's Cuba. The President's authority under the
Hostage Act to restrict area travel will be a question of first impression.i20 The President can make a convincing argument that he may
exercise his broad foreign affairs power to protect the safety of
2
American travellers.' '

The courts must similarly balance competing interests when
they hear a first amendment objection to Presidential action under
the Hostage Act.' 22 Assertions of foreign relations and war powers
and he does act pursuant to the *'express authorization- of Congress [citing the
Act]
This direction to the President by Congress is unequivocal. It completely
supports every act and order that he has taken to free the United States hostages.
No further scrutiny of his acts is required or necessary.
Id at 753 (Mackinnon. J.. concurring).
117. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The Court held that the right to travel is a
fifth amendment liberty of which the individual can be deprived only by due process of
law, and which can only be regulated pursuant to the law-making functions of Congress.
Id at 129. See also Aptheker v. Secretary of State. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
In Haig v. Agee, 49 U.S.L.W. 4869 (1981). the Supreme Court rejected Agee's argument "that the revocation of his passport impermissibly burdens his freedoms to travel
Id. at 4876.
:7.
Revocation of a passport undeniably curtails travel, but the freedom to travel
abroad with a "letter of introduction- in the form of a" ,ssport issued by the
sovereign is subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations: as
such. it is subject to reasonable governmental regulation.
Id. See note 16 supra.
118. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
119. As amended in 22 U.S.C. § 21 Ia (Supp. 11 1978).
120. The President relied on the Passport Act. in addition to the Hostage Act and
§ 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976)) when he authortzed the Secretary of State to restrict the use of United States passports for travel to Iran.
Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26.685 (1980). See also notes 9-17 supra and
accompanying text.
121. See Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.). cerm denied 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
But see United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967). See generaly Note. The Right to
Travel and the Loyalty Oath, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 387 (1973).
122. Ramsey Clark, threatened with civil and criminal prosecution for violation of the
travel ban, advanced his right to meet and speak with Iranian officials as protected under
the first amendment. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1980, at Al. col. 5. He asserted this right as
superior to any contrary exercise of power by the President under the Hostage Act.
Another act of Congress, the Logan Act of 1799 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976)).
forbids private contact with foreign governments and their leaders, with intent to influence the government's conduct in relation to a dispute or controversy with the United
States. One recent examination of the law concludes it may be unconstitutional and
urges its repeal, noting possible violations of the first and fifth amendrmcnts. The fifth
amendment criticism rests upon the vague language and desuetudinous status of the stat-

402

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:369

will never dispose automatically of free press claims.12' In a number
of cases, however, free speech rights have given way to more compel-

ling state interests.' 24 The rescue of Americans imprisoned abroad
may certainly qualify as a compelling state interest; the Hostage Act
retains vitality even in the face. of first amendment assertions.

25

CONCLUSION
The Hostage Act vests the President with broad discretion. The
limited reliance he placed upon the Act in response to the Iranian

embassy seizure represents an important precedent for use of the
Hostage Act to deal with the detention of U.S. citizens abroad.
utc. which imposes criminal sanctions of not more than $5000. or imprisonment for not
more than three years. or both. The Comment's first amendment analysis suggests that.
abent a grave threat to governmental security. no compelling state interest exists to
require supprcsion of free speech. The Comment also stresses the availability of *'alternatise means" for the government to ensure its security. Comment. The Logan .4t of
/V
aa a Rest in Peace. 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 365 (1980),
123 See. e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S 713 (1971) (the "Pentag,,n Papers" casc.
124

Cases cited in HErIkN are illustrative:

The First Amendment has not precluded punishment for violation-by speech
or publication--of military censorship or other security regulations, of laws
against interfenng with the administration ofjustice. against individual or group
libel, public obscenity. inciting to crime, unlawful picketing. or disrupting the
Selective Service Sys'tem by "symbolic speech" like burning a draft card in protest against the Vietnam War. See Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47 (1919):
Beauharnais v. Illinois. 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Gibney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.. 336 U.S. 490 (1949): United States
%.O'Bnen, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Compare Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494
(1951) ..
Ht ,KiN. supra note 26. at 489 n.16.
125 Mr. Clark's trp. though certainly an exercise of free speech and political expres%ion. did compete with the government's interest in obtaining release through the unitary
efforts of the Chief Executive. Unless Mr. Clark can demonstrate valid alternative means
to accomplish that Presidential goal. his first amendment claims will fail. On January 7.
1981. the Justice Department announced that it would not file criminal charges against
Mr. Clark. but reserved the right to proceed with a civil action. N.Y. Times. Jan. 8. 1981.
at A6. col. 1.
Presently pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
is Jackalonc v. Andrus. (No. 80-1687). In November 1979, the plaintiffs, Iranian sympathizers, planned a demonstration in Lafayette Park. The local police initially granted.
then withdrew a parade permit. The District Court granted plaintiffs" request for declaratory and injunctive relief holding that 'iwlithout a very substantial showing of inevitable direct and irreparable harm to those held hostage in Iran" the plaintiffs' first
amendment rights would be substantially infringed. Jackalone v. Andrus, No. 79-3140
(D.D.C. Nov. 16. 1979). On emergency appeal the circuit court, in an oral decision from
the bench, reversed. The -demonstration at Lafayette Park has an unacceptable potential for danger to the hostages now being held in the American Embassy in Tehran."
Jackalone v. Andrus No. 79-2359 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19. 1979). Bound by the Court of
Appeal's decision, the District Court then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Jackalone v. Andrus. No. 79-3140 (Apr. 25. 1980). Plaintiffs appealed. Oral argument is
scheduled for June 1981.
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Congress intended a flexible range of powers for the Executive
in cases arising under the Hostage Act. Courts should respect that
intention when asked to limit Presidential action by declining to hear
the challenge if the political question doctrine applies, or by invoking a narrow standard of review. Criticism that the Act's powers are
unduly broad or vague may merit legislative attention, but should
not move a court to interfere unless the President clearly has transgressed the Constitution.
Gordon 1. Piper

